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EXPLAINING DUTCH FERTILITY RATES
IN A COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE
The role of economy, social policy and culture
Arieke J. Rijken and Trudie Knijn
Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 2, 3584 CS Utrecht,
The Netherlands
ABSTRACT: This article contributes to the search for explanations of the
cross-national variation in fertility rates by studying the influence of social
policy, economic and cultural factors on fertility in the former EU15, while
giving special attention to one case: The Netherlands. This country lacks
good social policy for supporting parents to combine work and care and
nevertheless has a relatively high fertility rate. This article addresses the
backgrounds of that phenomenon, using comparative macro level data from
several sources, such as ‘the child benefit package’, the European Values
Studies, OECD and Eurostat. We argue that bivariate relationships cannot
explain cross-national variation in fertility rates. Therefore, we analyse
configurations of factors, which shows among others that high availability of
part-time jobs for women constitutes only part of the explanation for the
Dutch fertility level. Good economic prospects and high male wages in
combination with relatively low female human capital make that Dutch
families can afford children at their own costs when men work full-time and
women work part-time. Therefore, the low level of social policy that supports
parents in the indirect or direct costs of children does not result in low
fertility rates.
Key words: fertility rates; family policy; economy; culture; cross-national
comparison; The Netherlands
1. Introduction
Despite the overall decline in fertility rates since the 1960s in most
advanced industrialized countries, some countries have higher fertility
rates than others. Though scholars on demography as well as on













































cross-national variation in fertility rates. Castles (2003) points out that
systematic and exhaustive comparative evidence for cross-national varia-
tion in fertility rates is only exceptionally presented. He states that
demographers focus more on the factors shaping individual choice than on
those shaping aggregates of behaviour, that economists tend to restrict
themselves to analysing the impact of economic phenomena and to model
building, while in addition relevant data on social policy have until
recently not been available for permitting even a rudimentary comparative
cross-national analysis (Castles 2003: 211). This is rather disappointing
because variation in cross-national fertility rates challenges academic
researchers as well as governments. Increasingly the ageing population is
of major concern to the advanced industrialized countries.
The aim of this article is two-fold. We explore explanations of the cross-
national variation in fertility rates by studying the relations between social
policy, economic and cultural factors and fertility in the former EU15
countries, while giving special attention to one of the deviant cases: The
Netherlands. This country is at odds with the overall European tendency
that countries have higher fertility rates if they also have a rather good
social policy for supporting parents to combine work and care. As might
be known, in The Netherlands such a social policy is rather limited and
nevertheless the country has relatively high fertility rates. We elaborate on
the backgrounds of that phenomenon. Although the wide availability of
part-time jobs offers an alternative route to combine work and care, we
show that high part-time female employment rates constitute only part of
the explanation for the Dutch fertility level. We argue that a configuration
of factors, including economic, cultural and policy factors, should be taken
into consideration to explain fertility rates. The Dutch fertility level and
its backgrounds are the main focus of this article. However, since we study
The Netherlands in comparison to the other EU15 countries, our results
also include a general overview of configurations of economic, cultural and
social policy factors that may explain high and low European fertility rates.
2. Fertility as a social fact: theoretical backgrounds
Potential parents will seldom decide to have children because their country
needs them, nor will parents explain to their children that they were born
because good quality childcare was available or because the macro-
economic prospects were promising that year. Social scientists therefore
should keep hold to Durkheim’s (1938 [1895]) adagio and unravel the
social facts that may explain the individual decisions resulting in national
fertility rates. The social facts that up till now have been found as







































adherence, divorce rates, service employment, female labour force
participation, women’s education, women’s wages and unemployment
rates and services to combine work and family (Ahn and Mira 1998;
Castles 1998, 2003; Esping-Andersen 1999). Underlying these factors are
three clusters; economic, cultural and social policy indicators. Theoreti-
cally each of these clusters contributes differently to the increase or
decline of fertility.
Economic theories envision children in terms of costs. Fertility is the
result of rational behaviour, which makes having children a form of
consumer behaviour; becoming a parent is a way of purchasing
commodities. De Beer (1991) shows that confidence in the economy at
the macro level has a positive effect on fertility in The Netherlands. The
micro level new home economics theory assumes a positive relation
between male income and fertility (Becker 1991). A high male income will
result in an increasing demand for consumer goods, including children.
The rapid fall in fertility which has taken place in many western countries
since the mid-1960s is occasioned by the raising opportunity costs of
children. These costs can be considered as forfeited income, in case a
woman chooses to become a full-time mother after the birth of her child,
instead of participating on the labour market. The increase in opportunity
costs since the 1960s was caused by the stronger earning power of women
due to higher educational attainment and higher labour market participa-
tion. According to the human capital theory (Becker 1975) human capital
declines when a person does not gain experience in education or on the
labour market. Hence, for higher educated women (potentially) earning
good money, having children is least attractive.
Transforming these micro level theories into macro level explanations,
fertility rates could be expected to be lower in countries where female
employment is high and where women have a good position on the labour
market than in countries where female employment is lower and where
women earn less. However, Macunovich (1996) assumes that the negative
effect of female income on fertility due to opportunity costs effect is
reduced because women can use their income to pay for childcare and
because formal childcare has become more accepted. As a result, the
negative effect of opportunity costs on the number of children will be
weaker than according to the new home economists, or can even disappear.
This brings us to the social policy cluster, outlined by Chesnais (1996)
and Esping-Andersen (1999). They indicate that in advanced industria-
lized societies the correlation between employment of women and fertility
is not only less negative than can be expected, but even positive. A higher
status of women and the policies necessary to bring about such a status,
may in fact become preconditions for achieving and maintaining a fertility
level that / more or less / suffices for the replacement of successive
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generations (Chesnais 1996). Esping-Andersen (1999: 67) states: ‘The
great paradox of our times is that familialistic policy appears counter-
productive to family formation. ( . . .) Indeed the correlation between
fertility and women’s paid employment is now exactly the opposite of what
we might expect. The higher the rate of female employment, the greater
the level of fertility’.
Since female education has increased and norms concerning gender
roles have changed, the classical trade-off between female employment and
fertility has changed in fundamental way. ‘The trade-off that once pushed
women into housewifery is now more likely to push them to reduce or
even forgo births’ (Esping-Andersen 1999: 69). However, in some contexts
female careers and children can become fairly compatible; in others they
do not. The role of a mediating variable is important here; the degree of
‘familialization’.
A familialistic system, not to be confused with ‘pro-family’, is defined
by Esping-Andersen (1999) as one in which households must carry the
principal responsibility for their members’ welfare. This is why
familialism easily goes hand-in-hand with a very passive and undeveloped
family policy such as in Italy and Spain. The term de-familialization refers
to policy that reduces the individual dependence of the family, according
to Esping-Andersen (1999) the Nordic countries are most de-familialized.
Familialism may cause low fertility, but the actual incidence also depends
on other factors, such as massive youth unemployment. In conclusion:
Esping-Andersen claims that female employment levels influence fertility
in a positive direction where childcare and family services are available, or
where part-time work is available, and in a negative direction when the
conditions for family formation or combining work and family life are not
fulfilled.
The cultural cluster focuses on prevalent opinions on parenthood that
could influence fertility behaviour. For example, the care ethos indicates to
what extent people attach value to women themselves taking care of and
raising their children at home. If the care ethos is high, substitutes for
women’s ‘domestic time’ are not considered as valuable replacement
(Hagenaars and Wunkering-Van Veen 1990). Rindfuss and Brewster
(1996) discuss this issue using terms such as childcare norms / i.e.,
norms on who should care for children and what kind of care children
need / and attitudes towards working mothers. These form, according to
Rindfuss and Brewster, a major component of the degree of role
incompatibility between the mother and the worker role, which influences
the relationship between fertility and female employment.
If one sees the presence of children as given, a strong care ethos
negatively influences the employment level of women. For the purpose of







































influence of a care ethos on having children. If women want or need to
work and much value is attached to taking care of children at home (by the
mother), the fertility rate could be negatively influenced. Additionally, the
importance attached to having children could be considered. If in a
country the opinion prevails that men and women have to have children to
be fulfilled as a man or woman, this could have a positive effect on the
fertility rate. Finally, religion is assumed to influence fertility through
general values regarding gender roles and the role of the family in society,
and through specific norms or rules that encourage large families and
discourage (or forbid) birth control (McQuillian 2004).
Hence, the combination of economic, institutional and cultural variables
may result in a variety of configurations resulting in either high or low
fertility rates. Expectations about these outcomes must be formulated
carefully, because factors may oppose each other and it is hard to predict
which influences are stronger. If cultural values do not contradict the
economic framing of children as commodities, and women’s human capital
and opportunity costs are high, social policy supporting financial costs of
children or supporting the combination of work and family life is probably
needed to bring about relatively high fertility rates. If female human
capital is not that high, but male earnings and economic prospects are
good, family policy supporting parents might be less necessary to bring
about high fertility rates. A high average male income may downplay the
effect of opportunity costs, especially if women’s aspirations for employ-
ment are not very high. If economic conditions are rather poor, while
social policy does not support a family’s costs of children, fertility rates
will probably remain low.
3. Variables and data
This study aims to provide an additional analysis to studies presented by,
among others, Castles (2003) by analysing alternative / EU15 / data, such
as social policy data, survey data and the child benefit package and by
using an alternative methodological approach for dealing with a large
number of variables and a small number of cases. Before introducing that
framework, we will discuss the variables used in this study.
The independent variables in our study represent the three clusters
discussed in the theoretical section: economic, cultural and social policy
variables. Variables that are indicative for people’s confidence in the
national economy and their own prospects are the growth of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and youth unemployment. The
former is calculated as the average annual growth of the GDP over
the years 1997/1999 (Eurostat 2003). The latter is calculated on basis of
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the average unemployment rates of men and women in the age groups 20/
24 and 25/34 years old (OECD 2002).1 Male earnings are measured as
the average gross male earnings per month (Bradshaw and Finch 2002).
Five variables are taken into consideration because they can influence the
opportunity costs of having children: women’s educational level, measured
as the percentage of women in the age category 25/34 that has reached at
least ISCED-97 level 5 (OECD 1999, 2001a), female earnings, containing
the average gross earnings per month of full-time working women
(Bradshaw and Finch 2002), women’s employment rate (age group 25/
34) (OECD 2002), women’s part-time employment rate (age group 25/54)
(Eurostat 2001) and the gender pay gap. The latter is calculated as
women’s average gross hourly wages as a percentage of men’s gross
average hourly wages (Eurostat 2003). Women’s part-time employment
rate does not only give more precise information on women’s employment
in combination with the overall employment rate and therefore gives
additional information on the opportunity costs of children, but it is also
an indication of the availability of part-time jobs, which makes combining
a job and caring for children more easy.
Social policy variables are related to compensation for the direct costs of
children as well as to compensation for the time (indirect costs) that
raising children takes, by paid parental leave, and reduction of that time,
by offering childcare. The compensation for the direct costs of children is
operationalized as the level of the child benefit package (Bradshaw and
Finch 2002). As it is impossible to find an indicator for the accessibility
and availability of childcare (Bettio and Prechal 1998; Rostgaard and
Fridberg 1998), we use the percentage of children under the age of three
that uses formal childcare (OECD 2001b).2 Since the demand of childcare
exceeds the supply, these data about usage can be considered as an
indicator for the structure of child care services (Leitner 2003). Finally,
the parental leave arrangement indicates social policy support for the
compensation parents get for being absent from the labour market. We
classified the generosity of the arrangements as low, medium or high (at an
ordinal level) by looking at the length of and the financial compensation
for parental leave (Bradshaw and Finch 2002).
Cultural variables used in this study come from the European Values
Study (Halman 2001). Care ethos is the value people attach to a mother
1. Measured by combining unemployment rates of four categories: men and women in
the age groups 20/24 years and 25/34 years. The older groups are weighted double
because of the double age range of this category.
2. Formal child care implies both public and private provision in child care centres and
in residential care homes. Also included is care by childminders based in their own







































being at home to care for the children, measured by three items: ‘A
working mother can establish just as warm a relationship with her children
as a mother who does not work’, ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his
or her mother works’ and ‘A job is all right, but what most women really
want is a home and children’. Responses are scored on a scale ranging
from 1 (agree strongly) to 4 (disagree strongly). Chronbach’s a is 0.85. We
used the percentages representing the national distributions of responses
and calculated a country score for each item by multiplying the codes
(1/4) with the corresponding percentages and adding the outcomes.
The responses to the first item are inversely recoded. The final score is the
average of the three item scores. To create the second cultural variable,
that is the importance attached to having children, two items of the
European Values Study are combined; ‘Do you think that a woman has to
have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?’ and ‘How
would you feel about the following statement: ‘‘A man has to have children
in order to be fulfilled’’’. The country score on the first item is the
percentage that answered ‘yes’. The country score on the second item is
calculated by multiplying the codes (1/5) with the corresponding
percentages and adding them. The correlation between the two items is
0.91. To combine these two scores into one score, we use factor scores.
Finally, religious commitment is measured by the following question from
the EVS survey: ‘Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about
how often do you attend religious services these days?’. We use the
percentage of people that attends religious services more than once a
month.
The dependent variable in our study is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR).
A disadvantage of using a period rate is that it is affected by processes of
postponement and recuperation of fertility. However, given the purpose of
this study, that is to explore patterns of factors that may contribute to
cross-national variety in fertility rates, we have to use a period rate for
measuring the fertility level. Economic, cultural and policy indicators for
fertility are only measured at one moment in time, so they cannot be
related to completed fertility rates of cohorts. Table 1 shows the data used
in this study.
4. Comparing configurations
4.1. Bivariate explanations do not suffice
Before we discuss how to analyze our data, we look at the variation in
fertility rates. The first column of Table 1 shows that all EU countries
have TFRs below the replacement level as well as that there is a wide gap
769





































TABLE 1. Scores of EU15 countries on TFR, economic, social policy and cultural variables






























France 1.89 33 1281 65.4 48.6 88 1590 2.8 18.3 162 29 2 2.40 0.988 11.9
Ireland 1.89 29 1018 71.6 44.1 78 1543 10.3 6.0 91 38 1 * 1.024 67.4
Luxembourg 1.78 20 1717 68.3 46.1 * 2060 7.1 1.6 199 * 3 2.43 0.290 31.8
Denmark 1.76 29 1613 76.8 56.7 86 1978 2.7 6.9 140 64 2 1.83 1.567 11.9
Finland 1.73 45 1207 69.5 68.6 81 1520 4.9 13.3 191 22 2 2.13 0.754 14.1
Netherlands 1.72 25 1283 76.6 21.1 79 1966 4.0 3.4 34 6 1 2.17 1.808 25.7
Belgium 1.65 38 1370 74.8 35.0 89 1672 2.9 12.2 142 30 2 2.31 0.367 28.0
UK 1.64 28 1554 71.0 41.9 78 2086 2.9 7.1 142 34 1 2.33 1.054 18.9
Portugal 1.54 15 620 75.6 65.3 95 825 4.1 6.0 15 12 1 2.52 0.893 51.3
Sweden 1.54 34 1316 75.1 52.8 83 1680 3.5 9.2 153 48 3 2.02 * 9.3
Germany 1.34 20 1467 69.7 42.9 81 1961 1.8 8.0 152 10 2 2.45 0.264 3.1
Austria 1.32 13 1140 75.6 47.3 79 1870 2.7 3.9 266 4 2 * 0.476 42.5
Greece 1.30 28 759 56.0 49.0 87 945 3.5 20.1 59 3 1 2.74 1.435 43.2
Italy 1.25 11 1272 50.5 41.8 91 1501 1.8 19.8 28 6 3 2.69 0.381 53.6
Spain 1.22 36 1059 53.6 42.6 86 1405 4.2 21.5 15 5 1 2.30 0.239 36.0
*Unknown
1 Total Fertility Rate, 2000 (Eurostat 2002).
2 Female educational attainment: share that attained at least ISCED 5 (%), 2534 years, 1999.
3 Average female monthly earnings (£ purchasing power parities), 2001.
4 Female employment (%), 2534 years, 1999.
5 Part-time female employment (%), 2554 years, 1999.
6 Women’s average gross hourly wages as a proportion of men’s gross average hourly wages (%), 1999.






















































































8 Average annual growth of Gross Domestic Product per capita (%), 19971999.
9 Youth unemployment (%), 2034 years, 1999.
10 Level of child benefit package (£ purchasing power parities), 2001.
11 Share of children under 3 using child care (%), 2001.
12 Generosity of parental leave based on length and payment (1 low, 2medium, 3 high), 2001.
13 Care ethos, see Section 3 for operationalization, 1999/2000.
14 Importance attached to having children, see Section 3 for operationalization (factor scores), 1998/1999/2000.
15 Church attendance: proportion of population aged 18 attending religious services more than once a month (%), 1999/2000.




































































































between fertility rates in France, Ireland, Luxembourg and Denmark on
the one hand and Spain, Italy and Greece on the other hand. Striking
though is the relatively high fertility rate of The Netherlands. Given that
support for combining work and care is limited, which is widely
acknowledged (Knijn 2001; Portegijs et al. 2002), it could have been
expected that Dutch fertility rates would be low. Moreover, a cross-
national study of child benefit packages (Bradshaw and Finch 2002) shows
that the direct costs of children are relatively high in The Netherlands,
while financial support for parents by the state is minimal, resulting in the
lowest child benefit package of 22 industrialized countries after Greece
(see Table 1, column 11).
How to analyse these data? Although bivariate correlations between the
independent variables and the TFR (not shown) are not sufficient to
explain national variation in fertility rates, we discuss a few correlations
because they give a first impression. Positive relations between the TFR
and female educational attainment, female earnings and female employ-
ment validate previous findings by Esping-Andersen (1999) and Castles
(2003) and show that assumptions based on the new home economists’
theory on opportunity costs are not valid at the macro level. The cultural
variables / care ethos, importance attached to having children and church
attendance / correlate negatively with the TFR (see also Castles (2003) on
the negative correlation of Catholic adherence to fertility rates). The share
of children under 3 using formal child care correlates most strongly with
the TFR, in a positive direction (r0.65), whereas parental leave does not
correlate with (r0.07) the TFR.
We have to be careful though, the fact that the correlations are bivariate
implies that relations can be spurious and do not give information on
outliers, which implies the possibility of ecological fallacies (Ku¨nzler
2002). Yet, the outliers can be interesting cases. For example, Austria and
The Netherlands are outliers in the relationship between the child benefit
package and the TFR. This positive correlation (r0.31) does not
contribute to the explanation of the relatively high Dutch TFR and
the low Austrian TFR, since Austria has by far the highest child benefit
package and The Netherlands has the lowest child benefit package after
Greece. Furthermore, the correlation between the TFR and the female
employment rate (25/35) is 0.55, whereas there is no correlation between
the TFR and the percentage of women aged 25/54 that are full-time
employed (r0.06). Does this mean that the size of women’s jobs does
not have any meaning for the fertility rate, or could it be important in
combination with other variables?
Fertility rates are probably the result of configurations of variables and
therefore the best option for our cross-national analysis would be a







































methodological dilemma; the dilemma of the very small N in relation to
the number of variables that we are examining. A regression analysis
would only be possible if we could expand our N by including information
on a number of yearly data of the EU15, however, such data are not
available for all of the variables. That is why we decided to stick to the
analysis of configurations at a lower methodological level, a descriptive
analysis based on the basic principles of Ragin’s (1994) method for
‘comparative research on diversity’.
4.2. Method
The theoretical assumptions as well as statistical evidence discussed so
far, urge to take patterns of variables into consideration, like in Ragin’s
method for comparative research on diversity. This method is an extension
of ‘macro-causal analysis’ discussed by Skocpol and Somers (1980)
method to which ‘scholars turn in order to validate causal statements
about macro-phenomena for which, inherently, there are too many
variables and not enough cases’ (Skocpol and Somers 1980: 182).
Macro-causal analysis can be conducted using one of two analytic designs,
or using a combination of them. On the one hand, one can try to establish
that several cases, having in common the phenomenon to be explained,
also have in common the hypothesized causal factors, although the cases
vary in other ways that might have seemed relevant. This approach was
labelled by John Stuart Mill (1970 [1888]) the ‘method of agreement’. On
the other hand, these cases can be contrasted to cases in which the
phenomenon and the causes are both absent, although they are similar in
other respects. This procedure Mill called ‘method of difference’ (Skocpol
and Somers 1980).
Ragin’s method is also based on the principles of agreement (labelled
similarity by Ragin) and difference, but it takes into consideration complex
patterns of similarities and differences in stead of bivariate combinations
of conditions and outcomes. In addition, Ragin emphasizes that different
configurations of conditions can lead to the same outcome. To be able to
reduce complex patterns of variables to simple combinations of causal
conditions, Ragin’s method uses dichotomies indicating the presence or
absence of conditions and outcomes. In our study, this would imply that
countries can only be attributed a ‘high’ or ‘low’ score on fertility rate, as
well as on all independent variables. We refine this dichotomization
because it would be inappropriate to dichotomize variables on which many
countries score around the average. Therefore, we divide all variables in
three categories: high, middle and low. The classification of the country
scores into these groups is done by a K-means cluster analysis, separately
773





































for each variable, in which the number of groups is forced to be three.3
This procedure is used for all variables except for parental leave and the
child benefit package. For the categorization of these variables we follow
Bradshaw and Finch (2002). The results are presented in Table 2. Due to
adding the middle category, and due to the large number of independent
variables in our study,4 there are so many possible combinations of scores,
that we can only use the first step and the basic principles of comparative
research on diversity.
4.3. Findings
In Table 2 countries are ordered according to their TFR. As it is most
interesting to examine the high and the low fertility countries, by looking
at similarities within and differences between each of these groups, we will
not discuss the countries with a medium TFR (Belgium, the United
Kingdom, Portugal and Sweden).
If we would have applied the principle of agreement according to
Skocpol and Somers (1980) we should have concluded that a number of
our independent variables are irrelevant for explaining either high or low
fertility because some countries within a group with the same outcome
(either high or low fertility) score high and others score low on the same
variable, i.e., opposite conditions lead to the same outcome. For example
growth of GDP would be irrelevant for explaining high fertility and
average male earnings would be irrelevant for explaining low fertility. Part-
time female employment, the gender pay gap, youth unemployment, the
child benefit package, parental leave and the importance attached to
having children would be irrelevant for explaining high as well as low
fertility. If we would have applied the method of difference, we should
have concluded that all of our independent variables except for care ethos
are irrelevant because the same conditions (i.e., the same score on one
variable) occur in the high as well as the low fertility group. Care ethos is
the only variable for which this is not true, but it has to be noticed that
information on two countries is lacking.
However, in our line of reasoning, these results only imply that none of
the variables is sufficient by itself to bring about high or low fertility.
3. Sometimes a country with an extreme score is excluded from the K-means cluster
analysis, and added to the highest or lowest group afterwards, to avoid clusters
containing only one country. The K-means cluster analyses are conducted using
SPSS.







































TABLE 2. Custerscores of EU15 countries on TFR, economic, social policy and cultural variables






























France       
Ireland       *  
Luxembourg   *     * 
Denmark         
Finland       
Netherlands           
Germany       
Austria            * 
Greece           
Italy            





1 Total Fertility Rate, 2000.
2 Female educational attainment: share that attained at least ISCED 5, 2534 years, 1999.
3 Average female monthly earnings, 2001.
4 Female employment level, 2534 years, 1999.



































































































6 Women’s average gross hourly wages as a proportion of men’s gross average hourly wages, 1999.
7 Average male monthly earnings, 2001.
8 Average annual growth of Gross Domestic Product per capita, 19971999.
9 Youth unemployment level, 2034 years, 1999.
10 Level of child benefit package, 2001.
11 Share of children under 3 using child care, 1998/1999/2000.
12 Generosity of parental leave based on length and payment, 2001.
13 Care ethos, 1999/2000.
14 Importance attached to having children, 1999/2000.
15 Church attendance, 1999/2000.























































































Following Ragin (1994), we argue that we have to look at combinations of
variables: configurations of conditions. Table 2 shows that all high fertility
countries have a high or medium score on female education, female
earnings, female employment and male earnings and that none of these
countries has a high care ethos. These conditions seem to be necessary for
a high TFR but they are not sufficient, since some countries with a low
TFR also have one or more of these conditions. However, the specific
combination of the necessary conditions is not found in any country with a
low TFR.
None of the low fertility countries has a high score on the growth of
GDP, all have a low score on child care and none have a low score on
religion and care ethos. Again, these conditions are not sufficient, but the
specific combination does not occur in any of the high fertility countries.
This analysis does still not necessarily imply that other variables, which
occur with high and low scores in high as well as low fertility countries,
such as the child benefit package and part-time female employment, do
not have any meaning for explaining cross-national variation in fertility
rates. By comparing patterns of conditions, we might also find that certain
conditions are not necessary by themselves, but are necessary in
combination with other conditions.
Within the group of high fertility countries we see that France,
Luxembourg, Denmark and Finland have the highest female human
capital and opportunity costs. Although Ireland and The Netherlands also
have medium or high scores on female educational attainment, female
earnings and female employment level, they have only moderate
opportunity costs. Ireland only has medium scores on the mentioned
variables, furthermore Ireland and The Netherlands have a high gender
pay gap. In addition, The Netherlands does have a high female employ-
ment rate, but most of this employment is part-time, while this is not the
case in the other high fertility countries. Three out of the four countries
with the highest opportunity costs / Denmark, Finland and Luxembourg
/ also have the best policy conditions, while The Netherlands has the
worst and Ireland has mediocre policy conditions. Although good social
policy conditions as such are not labelled necessary, they seem to be
necessary in combination with high opportunity costs. Esping-Andersen’s
suggestions are confirmed here in a better way than correlation
coefficients can do: good family policy conditions work as a mediating
factor in the relationship between women’s economic position and fertility.
France is an exception that cannot be explained by our data, having high
opportunity costs, the highest fertility rate, but not specifically generous
policy conditions. This case might be explained by France’s pronatalistic
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polity, which does not result in high scores on our policy measures5
(though also not in low scores), but it is represented by the high score on
the importance that people attach to having children. Ireland and The
Netherlands are not only similar in having lower opportunity costs and
worse policy conditions than the other high fertility countries, the tables
show that they do not have opposite scores on the other economic nor on
the cultural variables. However, there is no clear common causal pattern.
We assume that in Ireland there are other reasons for the high TFR than
in The Netherlands, such as religion and perhaps the strong growth of the
GDP. We will expand on the explanation of the relatively high Dutch
fertility rate in the next section.
Within the group of low fertility countries, Greece, Italy and Spain have
a clear pattern: low opportunity costs (the high female educational
attainment of Spain being the only exception), unfavourable economic
conditions (low or medium scores on male earnings and growth of GDP,
high scores on youth unemployment), unfavourable policy conditions and
traditional cultural conditions. Apparently, traditional cultural norms are
not sufficient for high fertility rates if economic and policy conditions
are poor. Moreover, the high care ethos probably works against fertility.
We will come back to this issue later. One could wonder whether facilities
for combining work and care in these countries are relevant for the
explanation of their fertility rates, since in these countries relatively few
women work anyway. It is important to notice that in these countries the
unemployment level among young women is very high,6 indicating that a
large share of non-employed women are looking for a job. Since policy
conditions for combining work and care are not generous, it is not rational
for these unemployed women to have children. The configuration of
conditions resulting in low fertility conditions in Spain, Italy and Greece,
is not the only configuration that brings about low fertility. Germany and
Austria also have low fertility rates, but their pattern of conditions is less
clear-cut. We will discuss these countries in comparison to The Nether-
lands in the next section.
The picture that appears from applying the method of the comparative
research on diversity is telling us that (a) fertility rates should be ascribed
to a configuration of factors, and (b) that various configurations can result
5. For example, France does have long parental leave, but it is only paid for third and
subsequent children (Bradshaw and Finch 2002). This makes it a pronatalistic policy
measure, but not a policy that deserves a high score with regard to de-famialization, as
parental leave is unpaid for the first two children.
6. In 1999 the unemployment level for women aged 25/34 was 18 percent in Italy, 21
percent in Greece and 25 percent in Spain. For women aged 20/24 years the levels







































in the same outcome. How to interpret these results? Apparently our
findings support the reversal in explanations for fertility that is already
noticed by, among others, Castles and Esping-Andersen. The ‘traditional’
assumption of that higher educated women who have more to loose (from
an economic perspective) by having children may be true from a historical
point of view and may therefore explain the second demographic
transition, but from a comparative macro perspective this explanation
nowadays lacks empirical evidence: the more a country is adjusted to
integrating women on the labour market, the higher its fertility.
Furthermore, dominant cultural values do not seem to lead to corre-
sponding fertility behaviour at the national level. The more traditional
opinions on parenthood, the lower fertility rates are. A plausible
assumption may be that in traditional countries preferences of young
adults regarding the combination of work and care deviate from the
average cultural values and that social and employment policy is not (yet)
adjusted to the needs of the young adults. The familialistic character of
such countries not only forms an obstacle for young and well educated
women to find their way into employment, they also form an obstacle for
them to have children. To illustrate this, the negative relationship between
care ethos and fertility level fits in very well with the configuration of
factors that explain the low fertility rates of especially Germany, Italy and
Greece; the strong care ethos might prevent women who want or need to
work from having more than one child or from having children at all. This
negative relationship also contributes to the configuration of conditions
that explains the high fertility rates in Denmark and Finland. In these
countries there is no normative impediment to combine having children
and a job by outsourcing the care for one’s children to day care on a full-
time basis. Finally, our results more or less confirm that policy matters for
fertility. Countries that hardly have any social policy to support the direct
or indirect costs of children have the lowest fertility rates.7
This brings us to a rather deviant case: The Netherlands. This country
strikingly contradicts the general tendency we just described. Its social
policy supporting parents in the direct and indirect costs of children is
limited and nevertheless it has relatively high fertility rates. As an example
of how different configurations can result in the same outcome we will
elaborate on what is going on in The Netherlands.
7. The opposite however, is not true. The case of Sweden (medium TFR) shows that a
beneficial social policy does not always go together with high fertility rates. In this
country fertility rates appear to have been very sensitive to the economic recession
during 1990s, leading to decreased employment and cutbacks in child benefits. Still,
Swedish child benefits are generous by international standards (Hoem 2000).
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5. A deviant case: The Netherlands
While in other countries with a population having modern cultural values,
these are reflected in high full-time female employment rates, Dutch
women usually work part-time. In 2002, a total of 63 percent of all working
women had a part-time job (Portegijs et al. 2002). The modern values of
the Dutch population have not found their way in supportive social policy
for parenthood yet. At surface one would expect low fertility rates in The
Netherlands. Why do Dutch people decide to have children anyway?
Interestingly, the conclusion should be that they can afford it by still
having a rather steady breadwinner family, nowadays transformed in the
one-and-a-half earner family (Knijn and Van Wel 2001; Portegijs et al.
2004). Our data show that first of all the average male earnings are high.
Second, female educational attainment and female income are only
medium and the full-time employment level of women is very low.
Moreover, the gender pay gap is high. The combination of high male
earnings, a high gender pay gap and women’s medium human capital
suggests that there are only moderate opportunity costs if women choose
to stop working or reduce their working hours after having children.
Therefore women do have children despite unpaid parental leaves and
shortage of affordable childcare facilities. An alternative assumption might
be that commercial or privatized provisions compensate for the rather low
level of social policy to support parents. This assumption can only partly
be confirmed. A study on leave arrangements in collective agreements
(Peters and De Jong 2001) shows that only a small minority of the
collective agreements (6 percent) contain payments for parental leave. In
addition, in 2000 only 17 percent of all collective agreements included
specific agreements for child care for children until age 4 (Portegijs et al.
2004). Moreover, a comparative study (Bradshaw and Finch 2002) shows
that in The Netherlands (like in Ireland and the United Kingdom) the net
costs of child care (after subsidies, taxes and benefits) are higher than in
other EU15 countries.
Besides, accessibility and availability of part-time work in The Nether-
lands is quite good. Already since the 1980s working conditions, job
protection and payments of employees working part-time have been the
same as those of employees working full-time (Plantenga 2002). Since then
the percentage of working women, not only mothers, who work part-time
has steadily increased, from 50 percent in 1990 to 63 percent in 2002. With
regard to the high share of women working part-time in The Netherlands,
one has to be careful with drawing conclusions about causality. Low female
full-time employment can be seen as an indication of the relatively low
opportunity costs; the loss of a part-time income means less to a household







































woman can decide to work part-time when becoming a mother because her
earnings are low and the costs of full-time childcare are too high.
Furthermore, it has to be noticed that high female part-time employment
levels in itself are not enough to realize high fertility rates. In Germany
and Austria many women work part-time (though not as many as in The
Netherlands), whereas these countries have low fertility rates.8
The question remains how this lack of modernization of gender
relationships goes together with the rather modern cultural values that
the Dutch population shares with the other countries with high fertility
rates. Obviously, and thanks to the high average male earnings, the rather
good economic prospects at the end of the 1990s, the low opportunity
costs and the rather good part-time work arrangements, Dutch women can
afford to work part-time. And that is what they want. All studies on
combining work and care by Dutch women show unanimously that hardly
any Dutch mother wants to be a housewife nor to have a full-time job. Two
aspects characterize this opinion: first, although the Dutch population
agrees with the idea that it is better for a woman to be employed and that
this does not harm children, the majority of the population, and of the
women too, disapproves of mothers having a full-time job. A national
survey held in 1995 shows that 64 percent of the respondents disapprove
of dual earner families with school-aged children, if dual earning implies
that both parents work full time (Van der Avort et al. 1996). Mothers of
school-aged children themselves completely agree with the rejection of a
full-time job. Knijn and Van Wel (2001) found that only 3 percent of these
mothers favour a family type in which both parents work full-time, 31
percent prefer a family type in which both parents work half time, and 46
percent of these mothers prefer a family with a full-time working father
and a part-time working mother. Particularly the higher educated mothers
want both partners to work part-time instead of the one-and-half earner
family type, but also hardly any higher educated mothers want a full-time
job themselves. Second, and in striking contrast with women’s ideas in
many other advanced industrialized countries, in particular the Nordic
ones and France, the Dutch population combines a low care ethos with a
low work ethos, at least when it concerns women. Value studies show that
more than in any other European country, the Dutch reject the idea that
8. Besides the part-time fertility rate, the other economic conditions of Germany and
Austria are also more or less similar to The Netherlands (no opposite scores), the only
striking difference between these countries and The Netherlands are the high child
benefit package of Austria and the high care ethos of Germany. These differences
cannot explain why Germany and Austria have so much lower fertility rates. Other
factors, not included in our analysis have to be responsible for these low fertility rates,
such as low ideal family sizes in Germany and Austria (Goldstein et al. 2003).
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paid work is the best route towards women’s economic independence (SCP
2000). And again, the same goes for Dutch mothers themselves; they
much more support the idea of an equal division of housework and care
tasks than the idea of an equal division of paid work (Knijn and Van Wel
2001).
6. Conclusion and further thinking on fertility
All in all we can conclude that Dutch fertility rates are high due to
economic conditions and a specific social policy, that is: good economic
prospects, a low unemployment rate among young adults, good conditions
for part-time work, in combination with high male wages and relatively
low female human capital and opportunity costs. Dutch families can afford
having children at their own costs (high male wages) when men work full-
time and women work part-time. Therefore, a social policy that supports
parents in the indirect or direct costs of children is felt less necessary and
its low level does not result in low fertility rates.
More generally, this study shows that a cross-national comparison of
combinations of conditions and outcomes contributes to the explanations
of national fertility levels. Economic, policy and cultural factors each play
a role but the direction of their influence on fertility rates is hard to grasp
and not one-dimensional. Nevertheless we can conclude that economic
factors seem to have most influence on fertility, though their influence at
the macro level is sometimes in the opposite way as is assumed by human
capital and new home economy theorists at the individual level. Also,
cultural factors play a diverging role under specific circumstances, and
social policy is an important mediating factor mainly when economic and
cultural factors are not favourable for fertility. As has been noted by others
(Strohmeier 2002; Daly 2005), the relationship between policy and fertility
is a notoriously difficult one and found patterns need to be treated with
caution, but our approach to look at this relationship in the context of
economic and cultural factors turns out to be valuable.
A drawback of our application of Ragin’s method, is that (a) the use of
three categories in stead of dichotomies and (b) the inclusion of many
independent variables did not allow us to apply further analytical steps,
which should lead to a reduction of the number of relevant variables, and a
reduction of the number of possible causal patterns (see Ragin 1994).
However, our detailed overview is valuable because (a) the direction of
effect of variables in one cluster can be opposite and (b) it shows for
example that one generous policy arrangement in an ungenerous policy
climate, such as parental leave in Italy and the child benefit package in







































We can imagine that other factors have an influence on fertility, such as
housing policy or the opinion on the importance of work for women’s
independence. Apart from that, this study gives rise to some recommen-
dations for further research. First, this study is only a ‘snapshot’ in time.
Our choice for analysing complex patterns of figurations implies that data
restrictions do not allow us to analyse fertility trends, as Castles (2003) and
Esping-Andersen (1999) do by sticking to, respectively, bivariate correla-
tions and a regression analysis with two predictors. Then we would have
needed difference scores (over time) of not only the TFR, but also of all of
our independent variables. Second, besides looking at the average number
of children per woman, examining the distribution of children among
women in several countries will give a lot of valuable information. Low
fertility rates could be the result of most women having only one child, or
the result of many childless women on the one hand and many women
with more than one child on the other hand. The choice of whether or not
to have a second or third child is different from the choice of whether or
not to have a first child. The unexpected combination of parenthood
opinions favourable for having children but a low fertility rate, such as in
Greece, might be explained by the fact that most women in that country
have only one child; the value attached to having children prevents women
from staying childless and policy and economic factors prevent them from
having more than one child.
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